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Literature and the Question of Philosophy, edited
and introduced by Anthony J. Cascardi; xvii &

333 pp. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1987, $29.50.
Discussed by Michael Fischer

However defined theoretically, literature and philosophy also
designate two departments in most North American universities.
The paths of these departments occasionally cross, say in a philosophy and
literature course, then go their separate ways: toward logic, in the case of
philosophy, and toward some variant of the still powerful New Criticism
in literature departments, where poetry is considered as poetry and not as

another thing. Combining literature and philosophy, or seeing them as
always already intertwined, dius involves transgressing departmental
boundaries and runs the risk of seeming dilettantish to those colleagues
who remain within each discipline. Literature and the Question of Philosophy,

an important collection of thirteen essays ably edited and introduced by
Anthony J. Cascardi, presents the work of several philosophers willing to
read literature along with, or as, philosophy. The volume also features
essays by several literary scholars interested in taking on what are usually
regarded as philosophical questions and texts. In this book, as in the journal I am reviewing it for, contesting the boundaries between literature and

philosophy takes many forms, some of them riskier and more promising
than others.

One reason for seeing philosophy as literature derives from our inability
to separate the two — or so Peter McCormick argues in his "Philosophical
Discourses and Fictional Texts." McCormick shows that neither speechact theory nor genre theory — or even some combination of the two — can
330
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establish what makes a text philosophical and not literary. McCormick's
convincing analysis invites us to read "at least some philosophical texts

with an eye to their fictional components" (p. 71), an invitation that Dalia
Judovitz (in "Philosophy and Poetry: The Difference between Them in
Plato and Descartes") and Harry Berger, Jr. , (in "Levels of Discourse in
Plato's Dialogues") readily accept. Plato and Descartes are appropriate objects — I could say victims — of such an analysis because both were of

course bent on purging philosophy of literary qualities. In both writers literature returns not just to haunt but to found the very texts that would exclude it. By "literature" Judovitz means such things as die dialogical format of Plato's works as well as the several metaphors, rhetorical figures,
and fables at work in both Plato and Descartes. Even the latter's hyper-

bolic doubt, for example, uneasily depends on die rhetorical figure of
hyperbole.
For Berger "literature" implies textuality, a "level" of Plato's discourse
that Berger wishes to distinguish from the "dramatic" and die "thematic."
Berger credits commentators like Paul Friedländer, Leo Strauss, and
Stanley Rosen for attending to die dramatic structure of Plato's work,

thereby seeing Socrates and his various interlocutors as characters in a
dialogue, not as direct spokesmen for Plato. Aldiough advancing beyond a
merely thematic or "ventriloquist" approach to Plato, these scholars,
however, in different ways still claim to "recuperate die presence of the
author [Plato] and to arrive at knowledge of his 'teaching" (p. 94). As in

the New Criticism, dramatistic considerations complicate, but do not
finally subvert, a mimetic view. By appealing to the open-ended textuality
of Plato's works, Berger wants to block die "moudipiece" approach in boüi
its forms — dramatic and thematic — in order to highlight what he sees as
"a central theme of Platonic discourse, namely, die structural inadequacy
and ediical dangers inherent in any mediod of teaching, and indeed in any

institution — whemer educational, political, social, or more broadly
cultural — committed to die dramatic or logocentric level of discourse and
grounded in the speaking presence of institutional actors" (p. 96). Widiin
this general critique, Berger finds in Plato "an especially pointed and poignant critique of Socratic mediod and die Socratic presence" (p. 96) uiat
previous readers have obscured.
Not surprisingly, Derrida figures prominently in all diree of die essays

that I have been discussing. (Roland Bardies plays a comparable role in
anodier essay in die volume, Mary Bittner Wiseman's "Rewriting die
Self: Bardies and die Utopias of Language," an intelligent, but strained,

attempt to demonstrate diat die later Bardies shows die way from
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established opinion to "utopias of language.") McCormick's epigraph
comes from Margins of Philosophy and his essay as a whole examines die
question, asked by Derrida in "Limited Inc. . . ," "to what extent does

traditional philosophical discourse . . . derive from fiction?" (quoted,
p. 64). In addition to citing Derrida on Descartes, Judovitz can write sentences like diese: "But this mark of absolute difference, which Plato seeks
to establish between philosophy and all the other arts, is itself the trace of a

series of differential operations diat reinscribe and retrace die figure of
philosophical discourse. However, the hierarchical exclusion, difference,
and domination of poetry by philosophy in the Platonic text represses die
very rhetorical and discursive structures that define it" (p. 27). And Berger
appropriately praises Derrida's "In Plato's Pharmacy" for trying to show
that the written text problematizes the argument and drama it seems to

represent. None of diese critics is a clone of Derrida, mat position, or
plight, having by now become fairly rare. McCormick and Berger, in fact,
criticize him: Berger goes so far as to say mat Derrida fails to see diat Plato

anticipates rather than resists the Derridean problematic. Berger, in effect,
does here for Plato what Paul de Man does for Rousseau in Blindness and

Insight, i.e., shows diat a seemingly metaphysical or logocentric writer is
more self-subverting dian he first appears. Along similar lines, in "Postmodernism in Philosophy: Nostalgia for the Future, Waiting for the Past,"
the concluding essay in die volume, Berel Lang advises mat "where logocentrism or reification is alleged, we look for the occasion of those charges
in the dramatizing eyes of die beholder, among die historians of logos,
rather than in the historical texts themselves" (p. 323). For Lang, the antilogocentric or "postmodernist" longing to break widi die past and diereby
end philosophy may be internal to philosophizing, even a prerequisite.
Despite diese critics' distance from Derrida, Berger especially seems
vulnerable to some of the objections Derridean deconstruction has triggered. I for one find it discouraging mat a critic on guard against diematic
analysis can go on to identify a "central theme of Platonic discourse" in the

passage already quoted. And I am not sure how Berger can earn his concluding claim that "the written dialogue [i.e., the Platonic text] represents
deep-structural necessities woven dirough die speech within which die intentions of a presence who goes by the name of Socrates are sometimes,
but only sometimes, inscribed" (p. 99). Even diis cautious talk of presence

would seem to resurrect the "moumpiece uieory" diat Berger is at pains to

bury.
But I will not press diese familiar charges here. I am more interested in
Arthur C. Danto's sharp comments on recent literary dieory in "Philoso-
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phy as/and/of Literature," the opening essay of the volume. As Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, Danto speaks from
within academic philosophy, well aware of its tendency to pattern
philosophy along die lines of science. From this point of view, style seems
irrelevant "save to the degree that it enchances perspicuity" (p. 4); the
standard literary form is the impersonal fifteen-page philosophical paper
intended for a severely limited professional audience; and philosophy aims
at solving well-defined problems and transmitting verifiable trudis.
Regarding philosophical texts as literary seems to jeopardize dieir intellec-

tual seriousness: it feels like a demotion to philosophers accustomed to
associating philosophy with science, much as, Danto says, regarding die
Bible as literature has felt like an insult to those who take it as a body of

divine revelation. Danto goes on to show that the wish of some
philosophers to emulate science has encouraged in semantical dieory a
crude view of literature based on bloodless abstractions like "Gegenstände,
intensions, fictive worlds" — "diemselves as much in need of ontological redemption as the beings to whose rescue mey were enlisted: Don Quixote,

Mr. Pickwick, Gandalf die Grey" (p. 10).
According to Danto, instead of rectifying die impoverishment of literature by some philosophers, recent literary dieory exacerbates it. Danto has

in mind die dieory of intertextuality, which he takes as arguing diat
literary works refer not "vertically" to reality but "horizontally" to odier
literary signifiers. Drawing on examples from die visual arts as well as
from literature, Danto argues mat "reference to die world works togedier
with references to other art, when there are such references, to make a

complex representation" (p. 13). Fortunately, "extratextuality" can coexist
with "intratextuality" — fortunately because from Danto's vantage point
outside academic literary criticism, intratextuality by itself reduces a poem
to an object of "specialist knowledge" and makes criticism a "kind of hermeneutic contortion that earns interpreters of literature distinguished
chairs in universities" (p. 13). "Why," Danto righdy asks, "since not ourselves literary scholars, should we concern ourselves with diese intricate
networks of reciprocal effects?" (p. 14).
Danto concludes by sketching a view of philosophy and literature diat
tries to do justice to the differences as well as the similarities between die

two. Put very simply here, literature and philosophy aim at universality
but construe this common goal in different ways. Philosophy wants
necessity as well as universality, or "truth for all worlds diat are possible"

(p. 17). A literary text is universal in being "about each reader who experiences it" — in allowing each reader to discover "an unguessed dimension of
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the selP (pp. 18-19) while reading, much as John Stuart Mill learned that
he was not a stock or a stone while reading Wordsworth. (This example is
mine, not Danto's.) The differences between literature and philosophy are
not stylistic or grammatical — and here Danto would agree, I think, wim
McCormick — but apparendy differences in intent. Ascertaining this intent takes us beyond Danto's essay but not outside diis volume, as I will be
discussing below.
Danto's essay shows how bodi philosophy and literary criticism can

benefit from being brought together. While I do not want to exaggerate
die completeness or novelty of Danto's remarks on literature, I mink he is

explaining the right thing, namely, why "literature, certainly in its greatest
exemplars, seems to have something important to do with our lives, im-

portant enough that the study of it should form an essential part of our
educational program ..." (p. 10). And I would agree wim him that
neither intratextuality nor "the chilling tale of fictional reference" told by
semantical theorists adequately accounts for diis importance. If Danto
thus provides literary critics a way of beginning to explain the significance
of their subject, he gives philosophers a way of understanding

philosophical texts that does not treat their literary status as "a consolation
prize for failing to be true" (p. 21). For Danto, philosophical texts are
literary to the extent that they exist for readers in search of the kind of selfdiscovery diat literature rewards. In the standard academic philosophical

paper, the longing to be scientific (i.e., not literary) accordingly involves
overlooking die reader, or making "die reader ontologically weightless, a
sort of disembodied professional conscience" (p. 23). Far from trivializing
philosophy, Danto's concern for its literary qualities mus aims at revitalizing it.
I have been focusing on several essays interested in redefining
philosophy as literature. Other essays in this volume move toward seeing
literature as in some sense philosophical or at least illuminated by ex-

perience with philosophical texts. Denis Dutton's "Why Intentionalism
Won't Go Away," Stanley Rosen's "The Limits of Interpretation," and

Alexander Nehamas's "Writer, Text, Work, Author" apply philosophy to
the dieory of interpretation. In introducing Rosen's essay, Cascardi

remarks that contemporary literary theorists have often turned to
philosophers such as Gadamer, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and, again,
Derrida for guidance in devising an adequate account of interpretation.
Rosen sees this recourse to philosophy as a symptom of "decadence," a
sign that for us reading is "no longer a pleasure or an illumination" but a

problem that we mistakenly diink die right dieory or mediod will solve (p.
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213). According to Rosen, we have lost confidence in what Husserl called
die natural attitude and what Rosen calls "die predieoretical talent of

natural reason" (p. 239), renamed "insight" and "common sense" by
Cascardi in his introduction.

I would agree widi Rosen that some recent critics are guilty of relying
on philosophy and dieory in diis submissive way but would argue mat

there is no going back to the days when a critic like R. S. Crane could
count as one of die "crucial facts" in interpretation "die peculiar sequence
of emotions we feel when we read die work unbiased by critical doctrine." l
No one reads a work unbiased by critical doctrine; extending Lang, I
would say no one ever has. Theory is thus here to stay and no appeal to
"natural reason" is going to dislodge it. I suspect Rosen would concur:
citing Nietzsche, he can call man "the thinking or theorizing animal, the

animal who is looking for completeness" (p. 215). But although we cannot
steer clear of theory, we need not be helplessly dependent on it, as Dutton

and Nehamas in different ways show.
Dutton takes up the question of audiorial intent in interpretation, a

dieoretical question if diere ever was one, by which I mean a question mat
has tempted literary critics to turn for help to philosophers, often in the
hope of establishing once and for all die place of authorial intent in

criticism. Discussing questions raised by ironic texts, anachronistic
readings, and miscategorized works of art, Dutton argues for die
relevance of audiorial intention despite the many different critical meories
diat have announced die death, or at least die unknowability, of die
aumor. Dutton sensibly concludes that "since words and texts are used by
authors for myriad purposes, their intentions will never be found generally

irrelevant to some of the interesting and legitimate things that critics may
sometimes wish to say about some texts" (p. 206). While I agree with mis
conclusion, I am more interested here in how Dutton arrives at it. He

neither avoids philosophy nor expects definitive answers from it. Tacidy
extending Wittgenstein, he bases his view of intention on critical practice,
me contexts of which, he reminds us, "are as varied as diose of literature

itself" (p. 206).

Nehamas's strategy is similar. Again philosophy comes into play, mis
time in the form of Hobbes's claim that authors own their writings and
Foucault's diesis mat authorship dius defined is a repressive modern invention — repressive because it limits criticism to restating what die audior

presumably meant instead of producing new meanings. Nehamas wants

to distinguish the author from the writer (the historical person producing
die text) widiout, however, reducing the aumor to a fictional character or
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some other immanent effect of the text. From Nehamas's point of view,

while all texts are written, only some have authors, where having an
audior means being construed as an action whose meaning we are in-

terested in figuring out. Distinct from die writer outside the text as well as
from a fictional character in it, the aumor is "the agent postulated in order

to account for construing a text as the product of an action" (p. 281). Not
all texts are so construed, but we cannot specify in advance or with certainty what texts will count as literary works, diat is, as works with authors
or works that we want to interpret. To put one of Nehamas's own statements a bit differently, interpretation — or assigning a text an author —
begins when interest is stimulated, not when certainty is achieved (see p.

278). As Nehamas points out, the possibility that we might treat a text as
having an aumor does not mean that we do. Though not "an independent
constraint, forbidding in an a priori manner desired but unlawful inter-

pretations" (p. 289), me author is also not arbitrary. Akhough I endorse
diis conclusion, I am most attracted to the appeal to practice supporting it.
Nehamas refuses to brand as "arbitrary" everything mat cannot be sup-

ported by demonstrative argument. For Nehamas, "to show that a wellestablished practice is arbitrary [here, assigning certain texts aumors and
interpreting diem accordingly] entails showing that at least one alternative
practice, truly distinct from it, actually exists and makes a claim to being
followed. . . . The mere possibility of alternatives never shows that ac-

tuality is dispensable" (p. 285).
I would call Nehamas's essay as well as Dutton's "Wittgensteinian" not

because diey obsequiously cite Wittgenstein (diey don't) but because diey
extend his respect for practice to literary questions. These two essays show

how literary dieorists can use philosophy wimout seeking from it the
authoritative answers that Rosen rightly suspects. Again to quote

Nehamas, "it is a fruitless task, which some might call 'metaphysical' [or
philosophical] in a pejorative sense, to try to determine the nature of a
discipline independendy of its actual practice and in the hope that this
nature will itself determine die practice. We can tell diat a particular text
is a work only when we can actually criticize it: which texts are works will

depend on what counts as criticism, and what counts as criticism will depend on which texts have been considered as works" (p. 283).
If Dutton and Nehamas thus apply philosophy to literary dieory, the remaining essays in the volume plumb the philosophical dimensions of

literary works. Cascardi, in "From the Sublime to the Natural: Romantic
Responses to Kant," looks at the romantics' uneasiness wim Kant's
guaranteeing knowledge but only on the condition mat we surrender
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claims to know things-in-themselves. (Stanley Cavell has recendy put the
romantics' reaction to Kant's settlement with skepticism mis way: "Thanks
for nothing.")2 The fact that the romantics responded to Kant is hardly
news, as Cascardi himself suggests when he cites Northrop Frye's com-

ment in A Study of English Romanticism (1968) mat "the shadow of Kant's
riddle falls across the whole Romantic movement" (quoted, p. 114).3

Cascardi goes beyond a comment like Frye's by showing how several
romantic texts wrestle with Kant's limitation on knowledge, especially

with its moral implications, instead of simply registering its effect. Cascardi groups writers like Shakespeare (in The Winter's Tale), Rousseau,
Wordsworth, and Coleridge with philosophers like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, documenting the interest of each in exploring

diings-in-themselves. (In a related essay in the volume, David Halliburton
makes a similar move when he uses a Robert Frost poem as well as texts

by Hobbes, Peirce, and Heidegger to work out a "theory of constitution.")
I like Cascardi's unstated claim mat literary texts think through
epistemological and moral questions but I occasionally miss in his essay
Frye's sensitivity to die symbolism, imagery and plots— the "literary"
dimension — of romanticism. He can say that "the romantic strategy

might be thought of as an application of aesmetic experience to die problems generated (and implicitly, left unsolved) by the Critique ofPure Reason7'
(p. 106). Such a statement, whatever its odier merits, exaggerates Kant's
importance and makes romanticism a more bookish affair than it actually
was. Blake, for example, entitled one of his most famous poems Milton
(not Kant) and I cannot imagine him "applying" aesthetic experience to
anydiing, not even to the failure of the French Revolution, surely as
significant an event in romanticism as die Critique. I would agree diat Kant
and die French Revolution, even Kant and Blake, have somediing to do

with one another. The romantics reacted to Kant, as Cascardi thoroughly
shows, but bodi Kant and die romantics responded to historical, personal,
and literary pressures diat are sometimes slighted in Cascardi's essay.
Kant also plays a key role in Charles Altieri's "From Expressivist
Aesthetics to Expressivist Ernies," which applies contemporary literary
theory to a philosophical problem, thus reversing the path taken by Dutton and Nehamas in the essays discussed above. That problem, a legacy of

antifoundational diinking, involves aumorizing ediical judgments in the

apparent absence of rational, "third-person" standards. Building on his

book Act and Quality, Altieri fashions an expressive dieory of literature indebted to Nelson Goodman, Wittgenstein, and Charles Taylor as well as
to Kant's aesdietics. Literary experience, as characterized by diis ex-
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pressive dieory, fills the void left by the collapse of moral universals: in
Altieri's words, die arts offer "die most fully articulated models of expression that can connect first-person states to second-order concerns for selfreflexive public identity, concerns mat tie self-interest to obligations in-

volving a range of ideals and cultural exemplars* (p. 136). Even in a
volume of adventuresome essays, Altieri's stands out as unusually ambitious. He is not only responding to a central issue in contemporary
ethics; he is also criticizing New Historicist literary critics for discussing

values and literary works solely in ideological terms. Altieri wants to show
mat "the fullest social uses of art have less to do with exposing the historical
conditions of dieir genesis than widi clarifying the ways in which they help
us understand ourselves as value-creating agents and make possible communities who can assess those creations widiout relying on the categorical
terms traditional to moral philosophy" (p. 135). I share Altieri's objectives
here, although I think he caricatures the New Historicists who disagree

widi him, especially Jerome McGann, whom he hastily accuses of"identifying with a Byronic nihilism as die only authentic way to survive the very
history" he embraces (p. 160).
Martha Nussbaum, in "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible':

Literature and die Moral Imagination," also affirms the importance of
literary texts to moral experience. Nussbaum goes so far as to argue that
"the novel itself is a moral achievement, and the well-lived life is a work of

literary art" (p. 169). Her example of the novel is Henry James's The
Golden Bowl, in particular die crucial scene in which Maggie and her fadier

must give one another up. Nussbaum brilliandy shows that diis moment
demands something from everyone: the correct tone, gestures, and words
from the two characters, as well as the right mix of perception, improvisation, and obligation; extraordinary psychological insight and literary skill

from James; and unflagging attentiveness from the reader. These are
moral demands; diey test everyone's ability "not to miss anydiing, to be

keen radier than obtuse," "to be responsible to more" (pp. 188-89).
Nussbaum's intricate, finely worded commentary more than meets these

demands: her essay is a major contribution to ethical and literary dieory as
well as a dazzling reading of a complex novel.4
Even a volume as rich as this one has its gaps. No one, for example,
mentions Stanley CaveU's important work on skepticism and Shake-

speare, let alone his provocative claim that Thoreau and Emerson inaugurate American philosophy. But no book can do everything and
Literature and the Question of Philosophy does enough to show what can hap-

pen when literature and philosophy are freed from their departmental cells
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and allowed to interact. In these impressive essays, philosophy rediscovers
diat it is written; literature recaptures its moral seriousness.
University of New Mexico

1 . R. S. Crane, The Languages ofCriticism and the Structure ofPoetry (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1953), p. 179.

2.Stanley Cavell, "In Quest of the Ordinary: Texts of Recovery," in Romanticism and
Contemporary Criticism, ed. Morris Eaves and Michael Fischer (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986), p. 191.
3.I wish someone in this volume had addressed Frye's view of the relationship between
literature and philosophy. As early as the Anatomy of Criticism, Frye was arguing that "all
structures in words are partly rhetorical, and hence literary, and that the notion of a scientific or philosophical verbal structure free of rhetorical elements is an illusion." An-

ticipating an argument like Danto's, he goes on to add that "such an approach need not be
distorted into a poetic determinism, for ... it would be silly to use a reductive rhetoric to
try to prove that theology, metaphysics, law, the social sciences, or whichever one or
group of these we happen to dislike, are based on 'nothing but' metaphors or
myths. . . . Rousseau says that the original society of nature and reason has been
overlaid by the corruptions of civilization, and that a sufficiently courageous revolutionary act could reestablish it. It is nothing either for or against this argument to say that
it is informed by the myth of the sleeping beauty." Anatomy of Criticism (1957; rpt.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 350, 353.

4.In a lengthy footnote on a related essay by Nussbaum on James, Altieri objects that
her essentially mimetic view of literature and ethics leads her to confine the ethical force of
literature to the novel, thus slighting the lyric and experimental forms. I think that
Nussbaum's approach can handle non-novelistic writing but Altieri is right to challenge
her on diis point.

